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SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BIG BUTTE RANCH, INC., 
vs. 
MARJORIE R. ;-10LM, CARL 
WILLIAM HOLM and ESTHER 
B. HOLM, his wife, 
No. 14630 
Plaintiff-Appel I ant, 
Defendants-Res pendents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Uniform real estate contract provided that certain obligations of 
buyers (defendants) would continue notwithstanding termination of buyers' rights 
in the event of exercise of liquidated damages clause of contract. Buyers de-
faulted, the liquidated damages clause was exercised, buyers' rights under 
contract were terminated and seller (plaintiff) now seeks to enforce those ob-
ligations, which by their express terms survived termination of buyers' con-
tract rights. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The trial Court found that paragraph #3 of termination agreement 
was ambiguous, permitted oral testimony as to their conclusion that paragraph 
#3 of the termination agreement released them from all obligations under the 
contract, held that because of a delay in demanding performance by defendants 
that plaintiff was estopped, and granted judgment for defendants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
An order adjudging that the contract is not ambiguous, that plain-
tiff is not estopped to assert its claim against defendants and for remand of the 
case for further proceedings to determine damages or for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants purchased an Idaho farm from plaintiff under a Utah Uni-
form Real Estate Contract (R. 5-12), operated it for three years, defaulted 
in their payments and voluntarily permitted a forfeiture of their rights under para-
graph 16A of that contract (liquidated damages clause, R. 6). The contract 
expressly provided that forfeiture of the contract would not relieve defendants 
of their contractural obligation to provide certain produce to plaintiff each year 
for a period of years. Paragraph #26 of that contract (R. 7) reads in part as 
follows: 
"26. The I iquidated damage clause contained in paragraph 
16A of this instrument, if exercised by Sellers, shal I not 
2 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
terminate or affect the obligations of Buyers to furnish the 
produce described in paragraph #25 above ••• " 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract (R. 5-12) contained the usual paragraph 
16A provision, permitting the seller to serve a five day notice to remedy the 
default and forfeiting what the buyer had paid as I iquidated damages, should 
the default not be remedied within that time. Defendants acknowledged in the 
termination agreement (R. 34-37) that they were in default, that they were 
unable to remedy their default, waived service of notice of default and agreed 
in part as fol lows (R. 36): 
"3. First party (Plaintiff) hereby releases second, third 
and fourth parties (defendants) from further liability or ob-
ligation under the terms of said uniform real estate con-
tract to the same extent and legal effect as if first party 
had caused the notices contemplated by the provisions of 
paragraph 16A of said contract to be served upon each of 
said parties and said parties had each failed and neglected 
to remedy their default within the time specified in said 
notice and/or within the time permitted by law, second, 
third and fourth parties hereby quitclaiming to first party 
al I of their right, title and interest in and to said uniform 
real estate contract and the property and rights there spe-
cified." 
The trial court held that paragraph #3 (quoted above) of the termi-
nation agreement was ambiguous and over the objections of plaintiff permitted 
the defendants to present oral testimony to the effect that they understood that 
said paragraph #3 of the termination agreement released them from the obliga-
lion to furnish the produce. The Court also held that the delay of 2 2/3 years 
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in demanding delivery of the produce and in bringing suit thereon es topped plain. 
tiff from enforcing _its right to that produce, although estoppel was not pleaded 
as a defense (R. 31-33) and defendants failed to plead or to prove that they 
had changed their position in reliance upon any such belief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTRACT OBLIGATING DEFENDANTS TO SUPPLY PRODUCE NOTWITH-
STANDING TERMINATION AND THE TERMINATION AGREEMENT ARE CLEAR 
AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND ARE NOT SUBJECT TO CONSTRUCTION BY THE 
COURT. 
Defendants voluntarily entered into the uniform real estate contract 
which obligated them to provide plaintiff with specified amounts of farm pro-
duce each year for 25 years, and agree that this obligation would continue whe-
ther or not the rights of defendants under that contract were terminated, (R. 7, 
Par. 25 and 26). Parties are bound by the language which they deliberately 
use in their contracts, irrespective of the fact that it appears to result in im-
providence, beyond and perhaps in excess of what the mythical, reasonable 
prudent man might feel constrained to venture. Skousen v. Smith, 493 P. 
1.003, 27 U. 2d 169. These provisions were bargained for, in exchange for a 
low purchase price and low down payment, were agreed upon, and are binding 
upon the defendants. Parties are free to contract according to their desires 
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and whatever terms they can agree on, and the contract should be enforced ac-
cording to its terms unless the result is so unconscionable that a court of equity 
will refuse to enforce it. Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 548 P. 2d 889. 
How the parties fare under a contract is not the concern of courts, and in ab-
sence of some unconscionabi I ity, the contract should be enforced according 
to the meaning of its terms as intended by the parties insofar as that can be 
ascertained. Holley v. Federal-American Partners, 29 U(2d) 212, 507 P. 2d 
381. 
Defendants seek to escape their just obligation by claiming to have 
misunderstood their rights and obligations under paragraph #3 of the termina-
tion agreement (quoted above - R. 36). Defendants testified that they were 
aware of the obligation to furnish produce over a period of years well before 
they entered into the termination agreement. Defendants were represented by 
a person of their choice at the meeting where the termination agreement was 
discussed, agreed upon, drafted and signed. 
Defendants defaulted and plaintiff was entitled to exercise the for-
feiture and I iquidated damages clause of the contract (R. 6, Par. 16A) because 
of that default. Had plaintiff served the notice contemplated by that paragraph 
and defendants failed to remedy their default (which they acknowledged in wri-
ting that they were wholly unable to do - R. 34) then clearly under the terms 
5 
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of paragraph #26 of the contract (R. 7) the obligation of the defendants to conti-
nue to supply produce to plaintiff over a period of years as provided in paragraph 
#25 (R. 7) would have continued unaffected by the termination of the rights 
of defendants under that contract. Defendants elected to waive the requirement 
that plaintiff serve that notice (R. 35, Par #1), and agreed that said waiver 
contained in the termination agreement would re!ease the defendants from their 
I iabi I ity and obi igations under that contract "to the same extent and legal ef-
fect" as if those notices had been served and the defendants had failed to remedy 
their default, (R. 36, Par. #3 - quoted on page #3 above). There is absolutely 
nothing said about releasing defendants from their obligation to continue to sup-
ply produce. The contract expressly limits the release to the same release 
that would have occurred had the notices been served and the default had not 
been remedied, under which circumstances their obligations under paragraph 
#26 would have continued unaffected by those notices (R. 7). The words are 
clear and unambiguous and the court is bound to enforce the contract as writ-
ten. The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the par-
ties intended by what was said. The Court cannot add, ignore or discard words 
in this process, but should attempt to render certain the meaning of provisions 
in dispute by objective and reasonable construction of the whole contract. ~ 
Steel Corp. v. Eimco Corp. 548 P. 2d 892 (Utah). Where the language of the 
contract is clearly and unequivocally expressed, it must be enforced accordin'J 
6 
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to the terms. Conversely, if there is a basis in its language upon which the 
parties reasonably could have a misunderstanding with respect to its intent, 
then extraneous evidence can be received and considered to ascertain it. In 
making that determination, the Court is not bound by a single provision or ex-
pression, but should look to the whole contract and its purpose. Wingets, Inc. 
v. Bitters, 500 P. 2d 1007, 28 U.(2d) 231. 
Applying the foregoing rules to our situation it is clear that we must 
look to the four corners of the contract for its meaning unless the language use 
is ambiguous and uncertain. Defendants only point generally to paragraph #3, 
and the Court in its findings relied wholly upon paragraph #3 of the termination 
agreement (R. 7) in an effort to find an ambiguity. There is absolutely nothing 
in that paragraph which is uncertain or ambiguous. The termination agreement 
(R. 7) simply states that the termination provisions of paragraph 16A of the 
uniform real estate contract are exercised by plaintiff and that defendants' rights 
under the contract are terminated (R. 35, Part. #1). The provisions of para-
graph #26 of the uniform real estate contract the obligation to supply produce 
continued unaffected by that termination. In order that there could be no mis-
understanding, paragraph #3 was added which clearly spelled out the fact that 
defendants were only released from their obligations under the uniform real es-
tate contract to the ~ame extent and effect as if the notices of default contem-
plated by paragraph 16A of the uniform real estate contract had been served. 
7 
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Paragraph #1 of the termination agreement effected a termination of the rights 
of the defendants. Paragraph #3 of that agreement clearly spells out the fact 
that defendants are released only to the same extent as if those notices had 
been served. Defendants have not pointed out any word or part of said paragraph 
#3 which is unclear or ambiguous. 
Defendants seem to be arguing that plaintiff somehow had a duty 
to spell out in the termination agreement what the legal effect of that instru-
ment was by again reciting the legal effect of the obligation of the defendants 
under paragraphs #25 and 26 of the uniform real estate contract (R. 7) and by 
reminding the defendants that their duty to supply produce was a continuing 
obligation which would survive the termination agreement. It would be a dan-
gerous thing for one party to undertake to advise the other parties concerning 
the construction and legal effect of a legal instrument. The obligation already 
existed, it was not changed by the termination agreement, and should be en-
forced according to the clear intent of the parties as expressed in the four cor· 
ners of the two instruments (uniform real estate contract and termination agree· 
ment). All persons are presumed to know the law, including the legal effect 
of clear and unambiguous language used in legal instruments. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ESTOPPED TO AS-
SERT ITS CLAIM. 
8 
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Conclusion of Law #3, to the effect that plaintiff is estopped to claim 
the right to receive produce after three years (actually only 2 2/3 years) of 
silence, is not supported by the evidence or by the findings of fact. There is 
no claim in the pleadings, evidence or findings of fact that the defendants were 
in any way prejudiced by plaintiff having not sued them earlier. The claimed 
estoppel is not in connection with execution of the termination agreement, but 
only from the 2 2/3 years which passed between the date of the termination 
agreement and the time when the lawsuit was commenced. The Court did not 
find that the defendants had in any way changed their position or had been mis-
led to their detriment by that delay. Accordingly, the element of damage or 
injury is absent, which is an essential element for an estoppel. Miglaccio 
v. Davis, 1QO U. 1, 232 P. 2d 195; Cook v. Cook, 110 U. 406, 174 P. 2d 
434. It is an indispensable element of equitable estoppel, that person relying 
thereon must have been induced to act or alter his position to his detriment. 
Easton v. Wycoff, 4 U. (2d) 386, 295 P. 2d 332. The element of change of 
position or damage is wholly absent in our case and accordingly the conclusion 
of law that plaintiff is estopped should be reversed and the case remanded for 
a new trial. 
Further, estoppel is an affirmative defense which must be set forth 
affirmatively in a pleading (Rule S(c), URCP), or it is waived (Rule 12(h), 
9 
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URCP). Defendants did not plead estoppel in their answer and accordingly 
waived their right to assert an estoppel at the trial. See Tygesen v. Magna 
Water Co., 13 U.(2d) 397, 375 P. 2d456. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants clearly and unambiguously contracted to supply certain 
produce to plaintiff for a specified period, whether or not their contract rights 
as the buyer of a farm were terminated by reason of their default. That precise 
circumstance occurred. The defendants defaulted and lost their buyers' con-
tract rights to that farm. Under the clear wording of the contracts between the 
parties defendants are obligated to supply that produce or to pay damages for 
failure to do so. 
The conclusion of law to the effect that plaintiff was estopped be-
cause it didn't sue for 2 2/3 years after termination of defendants' rights to 
purchase the farm is not pleaded and is not supported by the evidence, since 
no change of position to defendants 1 detriment was pleaded, or found by the 
court. 
The Court erred in finding that the termination agreement was am-
biguous and by permitting parole evidence to vary the terms of the unambiguous 
contract. 
The decision of the Court dismissing plaintiff's case is contrary 
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to the evidence. The findings of fact and conclusions of Jaw and judgment of 
dismissal should be reversed, and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
This Court should find that the contract is not ambiguous and that plaintiff is 
not estopped. 
Respectfully submitted this 1tt< 
'2zt.. - / '7) 7 
day of -S-eptembery--19-767 
fJ 
, I •.'--)~de__ __ _ 
Ronald C. Barker, attorney for plaintiff-
appellant 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing to be mailed, 
-;Je-C-. 
postage prepaid, this 7t-J.. day of &eptemeer, 1976, to Lauren N. Beasley, 
Attorney for defendants-respondents, 430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111. 
Ronald C. Barker 
11 
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